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Abstract    
This paper provides a network analysis of federal lobbying in Canada by the fossil fuel industry and compares 
lobbying across the Harper Conservative and Trudeau Liberal administrations. The network we uncover 
amounts to a small world of intense interaction among relatively few lobbyists/firms and public officials in 
select centres of state power. Under Trudeau we find that the majority of lobbying is carried out by the same 
large firms as under Harper, while lobbying has become trained on fewer state agencies. We consider lobbying 
to be an important channel through which the fossil fuel sector shapes government policy. 
 
Résumé:    
Ce document établit une analyse de réseau du lobbysme fédéral au Canada par l'industrie des combustibles 
fossiles et compare le lobbysme au sein des gouvernements conservateur de Harper et libéral de Trudeau. Le 
réseau que nous découvrons constitue un petit monde d'interactions étroites entre un nombre relativement 
restreint de lobbyistes/entreprises et de fonctionnaires dans certains centres de pouvoir de l'État. Sous 
Trudeau, nous constatons que la majorité des activités de lobbysme sont exercées par les mêmes grandes 
entreprises que sous Harper, tandis que le lobbysme s'est concentré sur un nombre plus restreint d'agences 
d'État. Nous considérons que le lobbysme est un canal important par lequel le secteur des combustibles fossiles 
façonne la politique gouvernementale. 
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Introduction1   
One of the most direct ways that corporations reach into political society is through lobbying. 
By lobbying government officials, corporations and their affiliated trade associations work 
to forge and maintain close relationships with public office holders and advance corporate 
interests by influencing the policy planning process. This paper provides a comprehensive 
network analysis of federal lobbying in Canada by one important sector of corporate capital 
– the fossil fuel industry. We examine lobbying by oil, gas, and coal corporations and their 
industry associations over a seven-year period from January 4, 2011 to January 30, 2018. 
This time period enables a comparative analysis of lobbying under the Harper Conservatives 




(from January 2011 to November 2015) and the Trudeau Liberals (from November 2015 to 
January 2018). Our study therefore analyses the political strategies and reach of carbon 
capital2 in Canada across two successive administrations. 
Over the seven-year period, we find 11,452 lobbying contacts with government officials. 
This amounts to just over six contacts per working day. Within the fossil fuel sector, lobbying 
is, moreover, dominated by a handful of corporations and industry associations. These 
organizations, which control much of the economic sector, maintain a steady presence in the 
halls of government and exert continual pressure on (or work in tandem with) key public 
officials in their efforts to advance their interests. While there is a high degree of continuity 
in the lobby network, we observe some changes in lobbying patterns across the two 
administrations. Among them is the diminished role of Members of Parliament as a focal 
governmental target under Trudeau and the growing significance of senior public servants 
and midlevel staff. This points to the targeting of key decision-makers and state actors that 
remained after the 2015 change of government.   
Our study begins with a discussion of recent fossil fuel development in Canada and its 
challenges, followed by a brief overview of governmental policy frameworks surrounding 
carbon extractive development during the years covered in the study. We then analyze the 
data, starting with a focus on the two ends of the ‘lobbying chain’3 – the fossil fuel firms (and 
industry associations) and their state targets. We consider how this chain has evolved over 
time while also comparing lobbying carried out by ENGOS and non-fossil fuel industry 
associations.4 Next, through a network analysis, we provide a comprehensive mapping of 
lobbying relations between fossil-capital organizations, their registered lobbyists, the 
targeted public office holders, and the state institutions they represent.  
Canada’s oil and gas boom  
The scientific consensus holds that to remain within 1.5 to 2 degrees of warming and thus 
avoid catastrophic climate change, a rapid shift away from fossil fuels is required within the 
next two decades. However, in the same period during which the climate crisis has become 
an urgent threat, the Canadian economy has come to be focused significantly around carbon 
extractive development. Indeed, the boom in unconventional fossil fuels – especially bitumen 
from the Alberta tar sands, along with fracked shale gas and offshore oil and gas5 – has 
precipitated changes to the structure and composition of the Canadian economy, steadily 
elevating the importance of hydrocarbon resource extraction as a core industry (Carroll, 
2017; MacNeil, 2014). By 2010, Alberta had eclipsed Ontario as the province with the largest 
share of the nation’s capital stock and by 2013 mining and oil and gas extraction claimed the 
largest share of that capital stock (21.73%) (McCormack et al., 2015). In early 2014, at the 
peak of the oil boom, the extractive sector accounted for nearly 25% of private investment, 
up from less than 5% in the early 1990s (Pineault, 2018). 
Recent political economy and political ecology approaches have raised concerns 
regarding the long-run political-economic implications and path dependencies associated 
with fossil fuel development (Adkin, 2016b; Carter, 2014; Carter and Zalik, 2016; Nikiforuk, 
2010). Drawing from work on ‘rentierism’ and staples theory, heavy reliance on 
hydrocarbon exports is argued to pose a series of economic challenges, often producing a 
‘resource curse,’ or a ‘staples trap’ (Haley, 2014; Pineault, 2014; Shrivastava, 2015; Watkins, 
2006). The literature finds that reliance on oil exports often leads to revenue 




unpredictability while also undermining efforts to diversify the economy’s productive base 
(Laxer, 2015). Importantly, fossil fuel production is highly capital-intensive, meaning that 
employment in the sector is slight in relation to other industrial sectors and relative to 
output and emissions (Albo and Yap, 2016).  
Structural dependence on fossil fuel revenues (combined with distinctive political-
institutional configurations and policies6) has also been found to produce negative political 
impacts. In the Alberta context, research points to a cumulative deterioration of the link 
between the state and citizens, as oil rents release the state from reliance on tax revenue, 
contributing to its privileging of corporate interests over democracy and environmental 
sustainability (Adkin, 2016a; Carter and Zalik, 2016; Shrivastava, 2015). A resource-
extractive economy driven by short-term profit-making produces frequent clashes with First 
Nations’ rights, title, and sovereignty (Stendie and Adkin, 2016; Coulthard, 2014; Manno et 
al., 2014; Thomas-Muller, 2014) while First Nations and other communities in extractive 
zones and downstream continue to suffer often devastating environmental effects from fossil 
fuel development (Flanagan and Grant, 2013; Grant et al., 2013). 
States or regions suffering from a resource curse may also experience a ‘carbon trap’ or 
policy deterioration due to the “institutional molding effects” of oil revenue dependency 
(Carter, 2014, 26).7 Here government reliance on oil rents is argued to obstruct progress on 
carbon emissions reduction and environmentally progressive policies, making future 
climate adaptation all the more difficult (Adkin, 2016b; Carter, 2014; Carter and Zalik, 2016; 
Nikiforuk, 2010).  
Work examining the political inertia that characterizes fossil fuel dependent economies 
is complemented by recent literature that combines the sociology of corporate power with 
the political economy and ecology of fossil capital (Carroll et al., 2018a; Adkin et al., 2017; 
Carroll, 2017; Carter and Zalik, 2016; Graham, 2017). This research demonstrates that where 
carbon extraction comprises a leading sector, corporate power invests deeply in maintaining 
conditions for the accumulation of fossil capital.  
Studies have traced the reach of carbon-capital into political and civil society at regional, 
national, and international scales. The power of the sector reaches into civil society, as 
carbon-capital fractions and their allies participate in the governance and funding of 
organizations such as policy-planning groups, think-tanks, media outlets (Bonds, 2016; 
Brulle, 2013; Elsner and Kasper, 2015; Carroll et al., 2018a), as well as research institutes 
and universities (Adkin and Stares 2016; Carroll et al., 2018b; Gustafson, 2012). In the 
political field, a growing body of research has focused on corporate lobbying (Carter, 2016; 
Elsner and Kasper, 2015; Graham, 2017; Graham et al., 2017; Klein, 2014), as well as political 
party donations (Graham, 2017; Graham et al., 2017), and ‘revolving door’ relations or close 
personal ties between the corporate community and the state apparatus (Apeldoorn and 
Graaff, 2012; de Graaff, 2012; de Graaff and Apeldoorn, 2017; Taft, 2017).  
We draw from this research while focusing on one important vector of influence – 
political lobbying at the federal level in Canada. Our examination of lobbying over a seven 
year-period from January 4, 2011 to January 30, 2018 affords a close comparison of the latter 
years of the Harper and early years of the Trudeau administrations.  




Canadian fossil capitalism and government policy: Harper and Trudeau 
administrations 
Former Prime Minister Stephen Harper was forthright in linking Canada’s prosperity to its 
emergence as an “energy superpower” (Fekete, 2012). Under his administration, we 
subsequently witnessed a spate of new federal regulatory rollbacks and the formation of 
policy frameworks aimed at facilitating oil and gas development and other resource 
extraction (Carter, 2014; Gibson, 2012; MacNeil, 2014). Most notably, amendments in 2012 
to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act eliminated much of the core of federal-level 
environmental assessment in Canada (Gibson, 2012). In practice, the changes have meant 
that approximately 90% of major industrial projects that would previously have undergone 
federal environmental review no longer do (Johnston, 2015). In the case of large pipelines 
and energy infrastructure projects, which cross provincial and international borders, the 
2012 changes transferred responsibility for environmental assessments from the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA) to the National Energy Board (NEB), which must 
also conduct its own “national interest” assessment. 
The election of the Trudeau Liberals in 2015 appeared to portend a more circumspect 
approach to carbon extractive development, including the likelihood of tougher 
environmental regulations on industry and a serious commitment to achieving climate 
targets. During the 2015 election campaign, the Liberals promised to "modernize" the NEB 
and the environmental regulatory process as a whole, in order to restore credibility to the 
review process (see Tasker, 2016). Along with changes to environmental reviews, Trudeau 
actively campaigned on a shift away from the Harper government’s model of consultation 
with First Nations surrounding resource development. After years of federal Conservative 
inaction on the file, the federal government pledged to adhere to the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which requires free, prior, and 
informed consent for large-scale industrial projects (See Wilt, 2017). 
The ratification of the Paris Agreement in 2016 appeared to confirm this change of 
direction on climate policy as Canada committed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 
30% below 2005 levels by 2030. Yet Federal policy continues to move away from the 
commitments made in Paris (Hughes, 2016, 2018; Lee, 2017) while Indigenous rights, title 
and sovereignty are disregarded in favour of fossil-fuel development. Trudeau’s 2016 Pan-
Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change offers a policy of slow domestic 
and market-based energy transition, to be funded by expanding capacity for bitumen 
production and transport in the medium term, alongside the taxation of those same 
resources when used domestically. Within this framework, the government has approved 
and actively championed new pipelines, such as the Trans Mountain Expansion Project 
(TMX), despite lacking consent by affected Indigenous communities and clear evidence that 
the pipeline is at odds with Canada’s commitment to lower its greenhouse gas emissions.  
Lobbying is an important means of corporate political influence and we argue that the 
strategic, organized, and sustained lobbying efforts of the fossil fuel sector help to explain 
the close coupling of federal policy to the needs of extractive corporations. Before moving to 
our findings, in the next section we provide a brief review of literature on the lobbying 
process. 




Lobbying: what it is, what it seeks to accomplish, who does it and when?  
In broad terms, the goal of lobbying by private firms is to promote policies that increase the 
potential for making profit while blocking policies and regulations that impede an 
organization’s interests. The federal Lobbying Act in Canada defines lobbying as 
“communicating, with public office holders, for payment with regard to: the making, 
developing or amending of federal legislative proposals, bills or resolutions, regulations, 
policies or programs; the awarding of federal grants, contributions or other financial 
benefits; and the awarding of a federal government contract” (Office of the Commissioner of 
Lobbying of Canada).  
As this description suggests, lobbying may be trained on narrow and immediate pursuits, 
such as obtaining government grants, licences, and access to resources. Through lobbying, 
firms provide governments with updates on their activities while simultaneously conveying 
preferences, commitments and threats, or some combination thereof (de Figueiredo and 
Richter, 2014). Lobbying is also aimed at shaping and influencing the policy planning process 
and this involves a host of sophisticated techniques and strategies. As Brulle (2018) suggests, 
lobbyists and lobbying firms engage in extensive monitoring activities surrounding both 
minor regulatory changes and broad policy issues. They subsequently provide state officials 
with information, statistics, forecasts, background materials, as well as policy briefs and 
reports, in an effort to advance their interests surrounding policy. 
In this process, influencing and controlling a decision maker’s perceptions of an issue is 
central. Indeed, as Drutman (2015) argues, to influence the decision-making process, 
lobbyists aim not only to transfer information on a given regulatory process or policy issue, 
but endeavor more broadly to ‘saturate’ the intellectual environment, to overwhelm policy 
makers with information and argumentation on one-side of an issue, while ‘framing out’ 
competing or alternative conceptions. Along with efforts to control the understanding of an 
issue through the dissemination of information, lobbyists seek to simultaneously construct 
stable and long-term relationships with decision-makers through repeated interaction and 
communication (Ibid). Lobbyists therefore work to be viewed as principle stakeholders and 
as reliable experts, whose knowledge and expertise is trusted and whose arguments and 
frames ultimately come to mind more quickly than others when it comes time to construct 
policy or make a decision. 
It is difficult to establish the effectiveness or direct ‘payoffs’ of lobbying. Recent broad 
level and comparative studies have shown, however, that greater levels of lobbying lead to 
lower taxation rates (Richter et al., 2009), relaxed regulatory oversight (Stigler, 1971), 
reduced environmental regulations (Delmas et al., 2016), increased likelihood of 
government bailouts (Blau et al., 2013; Faccio et al., 2006), more government contracts 
(Goldman et al., 2013) and higher overall financial performance (Chen et al., 2015) for the 
lobbying firms. In addition to these indicators, numerous US based studies (where lobbying 
expenditures data are available) have documented the high levels of corporate spending on 
lobbying (Baron, 2012; de Figueiredo and Richter, 2014), including in the area of climate 
policy (Brulle, 2018; Delmas et al., 2016). This is a further indication that corporations see 
lobbying as a valuable component of their overall accumulation strategies.    
In terms of who lobbies, US-based evidence shows that corporations and their affiliated 
industry associations contribute the vast majority. Their lobbying efforts are found to 
consistently dwarf those of public interest groups and unions in terms of both expenditures 




(Brulle, 2018; de Figueiredo and Richter, 2014) and overall lobbying contacts (de Figueiredo 
and Richter, 2014). The bulk of corporate lobbying is carried out by large firms and 
industries with high levels of corporate concentration (Chen et al., 2015). Some research on 
the Canadian case has found similar patterns (Graham et al., 2017). Authors have suggested 
various reasons for the predominance of large firms in corporate lobbying: large firms have 
the capital and resources to do so; they may have greater access to politicians to influence 
policy, or they have the political power to influence outcomes (de Figueiredo and Richter, 
2014; Hill et al., 2013).  
Cronin (2017) has analyzed lobbying by the US Business Roundtable from a social 
network perspective. As he argues, policy planning organizations such as the Roundtable, 
which brings together executives of leading US corporations, play an important role in 
integrating different fractions of capital, helping to facilitate class cohesion. This enables the 
development of shared visions and strategies, facilitating the exercise of organized corporate 
power over political-decision making and public policy, especially through lobbying. 
Moreover, Cronin suggests the Roundtable itself forms an important component of a wider 
‘business advocacy network.’ In contrast to the pluralist perspective, in which lobbying is 
pursued by a multitude of firms (and organizations) with diffuse and competing interests, 
Cronin sees corporate lobbying as a networked or joint representational activity involving a 
certain division of labour among firms with broad shared (business) interests. 
Comprehensive research into lobbying by the fossil fuel sector at the federal level in 
Canada has been carried out by Cayley-Daoust and Girard in their Big Oil’s Oily Grasp (2012).  
Examining lobbying from the industry from 2008-2012 (October), they find that 35 
corporations and industry associations logged over 2,700 lobbying contacts, while just ten 
organizations accounted for nearly 75 percent of that total. Cayley-Daoust and Girard also 
report both a steady increase in rates of lobbying by the fossil fuel industry over that period 
and an especially sharp rise in 2010 and 2011. The six most active lobbyists (the Canadian 
Association of Petroleum Producers, TransCanada, Imperial Oil, the Canadian Energy 
Pipeline Association, Enbridge, and Suncor) in this period together more than doubled their 
communications with government officials between these two years. As the authors suggest, 
the start of this decade marked an important turning point in public debate over energy 
development, Indigenous sovereignty, and climate change. In 2010, for example, coastal First 
Nations declared a ban on supertankers in waters off BC’s northern coast and that year 
Enbridge applied to build the Northern Gateway pipeline from the Alberta tar sands to the 
BC coast while the NEB approved TransCanada’s application for Keystone XL. 
Our research takes off from where Cayley-Daoust and Girard’s ends. We track lobbying 
events from January 2011 to January 2018, but we also map those events as a field or 
network, linking the carbon extractive sector to federal institutions. We begin by providing 
an overview of the seven year-period, including a comparative analysis of the Harper and 
Trudeau years, with a consideration of how overall lobbying patterns and strategies have 
evolved with the change in political administrations. The data are analysed across three main 
domains: 1) The contacts by fossil fuel corporations or industry associations; 2) the 
designated public office holders (DPOHs) being lobbied and their position in the state; and 3) 
the governmental institutions being lobbied. Having identified the industry organizations, 
state personnel and institutional targets that comprise the field of lobbying at the federal 
level, we then present a network analysis that integrates these three domains.  




Sample and data  
Under the current federal Lobbying Act, which was brought into force in 2008, companies 
and organizations are required to register with the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying 
of Canada if they engage in any of a wide range of lobbying activity, including both written 
and oral communication. Companies and organizations employ either ‘in-house lobbyists’ (a 
lobbyist directly employed by the firm seeking to influence government) or ‘consultant 
lobbyists’ (lobbyists employed by a third-party agency or firm, hired by the company or 
organization to lobby on its behalf) or both. The majority of lobbying by the fossil fuel sector 
is carried out by in-house lobbyists. Lobbyists (both in house and consultant) must submit 
monthly filings that report the types of communication they engaged in, the subjects 
discussed, and officials or ‘designated public office holders’ (DPOHs) being lobbied, including 
their ministries and position in the state.8  
Despite recent reforms and improvements, various deficiencies in the Lobbying Act 
impede transparency and limit our analysis. One important limitation is that the Act does not 
require that the names of in-house lobbyists who participated in a communication with a 
designated public office holder be disclosed. Instead, the name of the most senior paid officer 
who is responsible for filing a return for a corporation or organization (the Registrant) is 
recorded, whether that person participated in a meeting/communication or not. As a result, 
it is not possible to determine which lobbyist(s) were involved in each meeting, or whether 
the Registrant (the senior officer, typically a chief executive) was present. This limits our 
ability to track lobbyists and their relationships with DPOHs. A further conspicuous 
drawback is the data’s heterogeneity and, to some extent, its poor organization. Problems, 
such as misspelling of public office holder names, reversed first and last names, disjunction 
of names and position titles or even fake names, are not uncommon, and therefore significant 
editing of the data was required.  
To track lobbying by the fossil-fuel sector, we began with 260 organizations: the 239 
fossil fuel companies based in Canada with 2014 assets of at least $50 million and 21 carbon-
sector industry associations. Of these, 32 companies and 14 industry associations were 
found in the Registry. The data encompass a seven year-period from January 4, 2011 to 
January 30, 2018. To enable a comparative analysis across the Harper and Trudeau 
administrations, the data are divided into two parts, corresponding to the two 
administrations, with the cutpoint set at 4 November 2015, when the Trudeau regime took 
office. 
Findings  
Top fossil fuel corporations and industry associations 
Considering the fossil fuel industry in Canada as a whole, we find 11,452 lobbying contacts 
with government officials over the seven-year period.9 This amounts to just over six contacts 
per working day. However, as seen in Table 1, lobbying is highly concentrated among large 
fossil fuel firms and major industry associations. The top 10 organizations account for 65% 
of that total number of contacts; the top 20 account for 88%; the remaining lobbying contacts 
are spread among 26 less active organizations. The leading lobbyists over period of the 
study, the Mining Association of Canada (MAC) and the Canadian Association of Petroleum 




Producers (CAPP) contributed 1,596 and 1,268 contacts respectively, accounting for a 
quarter of the total.  
  
In examining the entire seven-year period, we find some minor shifts in overall lobbying 
patterns (visualized in Figure 1), but the main lobbyists for the most part appear at the top 
of the listing throughout. Certain organizations’ lobbying efforts ebbed and flowed; CAPP, for 
example, was the leading lobbyist three years in a row from January 4, 2011 to November 3, 
2013. In the final year of Harper government and under Trudeau’s leadership it continued 
to play a central, but less dominant role, while the Mining Association of Canada emerged as 
the  leading lobbyist. 
 
 See Appendix A for full names of abbreviated carbon organizations and federal institutions  
 
Table 1: Lobbying Contacts of the Fossil Fuel Corporations and Industry Associations (January 4, 2011 to January 30, 2018)
Organization 2011 2011_2012 2012_2013 2013_2014 2014_2015 2015_2016 2016_2017 2017_2018 Total
MAC 65 223 187 233 165 249 396 78 1596
CAPP 158 335 256 183 77 94 132 33 1268
Suncor 50 92 126 137 102 179 168 27 881
TransCanada 127 77 126 138 109 111 50 13 751
Can Gas Assn. 88 158 82 94 49 100 65 5 641
Enbridge 44 92 131 81 51 108 42 9 558
En. Pipeline Assn. 68 107 44 47 44 95 69 4 478
Teck Resources 58 79 72 55 42 95 59 6 466
Kinder Morgan 20 45 127 101 12 52 36 3 396
Encana 115 55 45 26 23 21 104 5 394
Other 345 709 638 548 400 761 480 142 4023
Total 1138 1972 1834 1643 1074 1865 1601 325 11452




We also found a substantial decline in lobbying in advance of the 2015 election. The 
finding may indicate a short-term and pragmatic lobbying strategy: in an election that was 
predicted to result in a change of government, lobbying contracted as firms saw less value in 
lobbying officials that might not remain within the state following the election. This decline, 
however, paralleled an augmented targeting of nonpartisan senior bureaucrats (and 
midlevel staff) – which will be explored in greater detail in the following section. Despite 
these shifts, we find a remarkable level of consistency in the fossil fuel lobby. Just a handful 
corporations that control much of this economic sector, and key industry associations that 
represent them, accounted for the vast majority of the lobbying each year and maintained a 
consistent and steady presence in the halls of government. 
Industry associations and sectoral comparisons 
Central to the network of lobbyists are fossil fuel industry associations. Along with efforts to 
influence public opinion (through media relations, advertising, and other public relations 
efforts) (see Carroll et al., 2018), industry associations play a critical role in political policy 
and agenda setting (Stritch, 2007). They provide space for different interests within the 
broad carbon-capital sector to define issues of common importance and to organize 
strategies for advancing sectoral interests. They are able to mediate potential conflicts 
among carbon firms, allowing corporations to speak with a single voice.  
There is no one industry association that represents the entire carbon-capital sector, 
although the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (whose remit includes natural 
gas) comes closest. As we saw in Table 1, CAPP is the second most prominent lobbyist in the 
network, recording 1,268 communications over the period of the study. CAPP has 36 
registered ‘in-house’ lobbyists, the most of any fossil fuel organization. Its extensive network 
of lobbyists brings considerable information and tailored knowledge to the table.  
The fifth most active lobbyist in the study is the Canadian Gas Association (CGA), which 
registered 641 lobbying contacts. The CGA is an industry association representing Canada’s 
natural gas distribution sector. Its members consist of natural gas distribution and 
transmission companies, equipment manufacturers and other service providers. Describing 
itself as “the voice of Canada’s natural gas distribution industry,” the CGA defines issues of 
common importance and develops strategies for advancing the interests of natural gas 
producers and transporters.  
The Mining Association of Canada (MAC), which recorded an astounding 1,596 lobbying 
contacts over the seven-year period represents the mining sector in Canada, broadly 
conceived. Its members include non-fossil fuel metals mining and exploration corporations, 
such as Cameco, along with prominent fossil fuel firms. These include coal giant Teck and 
some of the largest bitumen mining corporations, such as Suncor, CNRL and Syncrude, as 
well as companies that are extensively involved in metals mining and oil and gas production, 
such as Sherritt International.10   
In comparison to other industry groups, fossil fuel industry associations are far more 
active lobbyists. The Mining Association of Canada, CAPP and CGA together recorded 3,505 
lobbying contacts. This is five times that of the most active forestry associations (Forest 
Products Association of Canada at 521 contacts, Coast Forest Products Association at 137, 
Canadian Association of Forest Owners at 27), more than six times that of automotive 
associations (Canadian Vehicle Manufacturer's Association at 262, Global Automakers of 




Canada at 154 and the Canadian Automobile Dealers Association at 104), and over 25 times 
that of the two renewable energy industry association found in the lobbyists registry (the 
Canadian Wind Energy Association at 89 and the Canadian Solar Industries Association at 
44).   
ENGOS and lobbying  
By way of further comparison, we consider the amount of lobbying by environmental non-
governmental organizations (ENGOs) – the groups most likely to oppose increased fossil fuel 
development. As expected, the amount of lobbying by ENGOS is much lower than that of fossil 
fuel corporations. A comprehensive search of the lobbyist registry revealed sixteen 
organizations that were active in lobbying during the time period of our study and which 
together contributed 2,399 lobbying contacts, or one fifth of that of the fossil fuel sector. The 
Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society at 628 lobbying contacts was the most active, 
followed by Environmental Defence Canada (234), the Pembina Institute (227), Nature 
Canada (218), Ducks Unlimited Canada (215) and the David Suzuki Foundation (205). 1,274 
of the contacts took place under the Harper administration and 1,125 under Trudeau.  
Officials being lobbied and their positions in the state 
The second major domain we examine is comprised of designated public office holders 
(DPOH) lobbied by the fossil fuel sector and their positions in the state. We coded all the 
DPOH positions into six hierarchical and functional categories: the Privy Council, 
parliamentarian, top bureaucrat, senior public servant, midlevel staff, and junior staff.11 As 
seen in Table 2, across the seven year-period, senior public servants (government staffers 
who are one level below the top bureaucrats, such as assistant deputy ministers, executive 
directors and chiefs of staff) were the most lobbied group. The midlevel staff group (which 
encompasses advisors, policy managers and directors), were the next most targeted, 
followed by ‘parliamentarians’ (Member of Parliament and Senators).  
 
While these three categories accounted for the majority of lobbying, we observe a shift 
in their relative prominence when comparing the Harper and Trudeau administrations. In 
the Harper years under study, ‘parliamentarian’ was the most lobbied category, accounting 
for 1,972 contacts or 25% of lobbying. In the final year of the Harper era, this group was 
targeted at a lower level (accounting for 20% of contacts), which is consistent with a 
Table 2: Composition Ratio of the DPOHs' Positions (January 4, 2011 to January 30, 2018)
Position 2011 2011_2012 2012_2013 2013_2014/Ratio2014_2015/Ratio2015_2016/Ratio2016_2017/Ratio2017_2018/RatioCategory Total
SeniorPublicSer 25.57% 21.91% 23.12% 26.42% 29.52% 30.40% 29.54% 23.70% 3015
MidlevelStaff 17.93% 20.23% 26.23% 21.55% 23.28% 25.74% 30.11% 28.92% 2744
Parliamentarian 24.52% 30.43% 24.59% 25.87% 20.20% 17.53% 13.12% 17.85% 2567
PrivyCouncil 16.26% 15.92% 12.16% 13.27% 12.66% 13.73% 12.18% 13.54% 1571
TopBureaucrat 13.62% 7.51% 11.94% 10.23% 12.01% 9.54% 10.81% 8.62% 1198
JuniorStaff 2.11% 3.80% 1.80% 2.19% 2.33% 2.79% 4.06% 7.38% 334
Other 0% 0.20% 0.16% 0.49% 0% 0.27% 0.19% 0% 23
Annual Sum 1138 1972 1834 1643 1074 1865 1601 325 11452
Note: percentage figures in the table are rounded to the second decimal place.




strategic lobbying approach taken towards a regime whose days may be numbered. 
However, this group remained less prominent in the early years of the Trudeau 
administration, moving to third position at 595 contacts or 15% of lobbying, whereas senior 
public servants accounted for 30% of lobbying contacts and midlevel staff 28%.  
In addition to delineating DPOH positions, we examined the top individuals being lobbied. 
In Table 3, we have identified sixteen DPOHs involved in more than 75 lobbying contacts 
with the fossil fuel organizations over the period of our study.  
 
 
In contrast to relationships with elected politicians or partisan staffers, which can shift 
dramatically as governments change, the fossil fuel sector maintains ongoing relationships 
with DPOHs in the non-partisan government bureaucracy. The latter are often top 
government bureaucrats (associate deputy ministers and deputy ministers) heading an 
energy-focused or energy-related federal institution, most often Environment and Climate 
Change Canada and Natural Resources Canada, and to a less extent, Transport Canada. For 
example, Mike Beale, the most contacted DPOH, is a long-time associate assistant deputy 
minister and later assistant deputy minister of Environment Canada (later renamed as 
Environment and Climate Change Canada), while the second most contacted DPOH, Jay 
Khosla, has been assistant deputy minister of Natural Resources Canada since July 2013. As 
lobbying targets, elected politicians and politically affiliated staffers rise and fall with the 
fortunes of their parties; Joe Oliver and Jason Kenney were gone from Parliament after the 
2015 election and therefore not lobbied, while James Carr and Marlo Raynolds rapidly 
emerged as key targets immediately after the 2015 election. 
There was also a shift, after the 2015 change in government, toward targeting senior 
public servants. Among the top ten senior government bureaucrats who have currently 
remained in their position, annual contacts with fossil fuel interest groups averaged 144.5 
under the Harper regime and 228.5 under the Trudeau government.12 And, as the findings in 
Table 2 show, 39.79% of all lobbying contacts during the latter part of the Harper regime 
Table 3: Most Contacted Federal Public Office Holders
DPOH Name 2011 2011_2012 2012_2013 2013_2014 2014_2015 2015_2016 2016_2017 2017_2018 Total
Mike Beale 43 84 40 41 33 46 41 11 339
Jay Khosla 19 21 28 58 24 52 43 6 251
Marlo Raynolds 0 0 0 0 0 51 67 7 125
Serge Dupont 23 23 36 33 0 5 2 0 122
M. Campbell-Jarvis 0 0 8 23 25 31 25 0 112
Joe Oliver 25 35 32 8 12 0 0 0 112
Bob Hamilton 2 6 36 23 15 19 0 0 101
Mark Corey 28 41 27 0 0 0 0 0 96
Dave Forestell 21 54 20 0 0 0 0 0 95
Greg McFarlane 0 15 52 24 3 0 0 0 94
Christopher Praught 3 7 34 22 19 0 0 0 85
James Carr 0 0 0 0 0 42 29 13 84
Michael Keenan 5 8 21 23 5 13 7 0 82
Jason Kenney 23 22 15 14 5 2 0 0 81
Guillaume Julien 0 0 0 0 0 11 52 17 80
Stephen Lucas 1 6 11 12 5 11 30 1 77
Other 945 1650 1474 1362 928 1582 1305 270 9516
Total 1138 1972 1834 1643 1074 1865 1601 325 11452




involved parliamentarians and members of the Privy Council, compared to the first part of 
the Trudeau regime. When the government changed it was the senior government 
bureaucrats who continued to be the targets of extensive lobbying – and at an increased rate. 
This points towards a “deep state” or “state within a state” (Lofgren 2016; Taft 2017), 
whereby key state institutions and actors become extensively integrated with private firms 
and interests groups that together co-produce regulation and policy and “with only limited 
reference to the consent of the governed as normally expressed in elections (Garett, quoted 
in Taft 2017, 118). In an established deep state “leading owners and executives of major 
private interests” are fused together with state managers “inordinately committed to the 
success of those interests” (Taft 2017, 118). The deep state, which retains substantial 
autonomy from controls or regulation by elected officials, far outlasts election cycles. 
The third domain of analysis concerns the federal institutions that were lobbied by the 
fossil fuel industry. Given its complex structure, we divide the House of Commons into two 
more specific categories: the elected politicians and the hired staffers who assist them. In 
Figure 2, the former category is coded as CommonsP, the latter as CommonsS. Even after the 
division, the former was still the most lobbied institution.  
 
 
Across the administrations we find both continuity and discontinuity in the state bodies 
that were lobbied. Under Harper, the House of Commons (P) was the most lobbied institution 
and the primary target in each year. However, consistent with the trend for elected 
politicians to become less targeted for lobbying under Trudeau in favour of the senior public 
servants and midlevel staff, the House of Commons (P) became less targeted in the first year 
of Trudeau’s government and was overtaken by Natural Resources Canada. More industry 




attention was also directed at Environment Canada, the second most targeted body in 2016-
17.  
The network overall, from Harper to Trudeau 
Having identified the industry organizations, state personnel, and institutional targets 
that comprise the field of lobbying at the federal level, we now present a network analysis 
that integrates these three domains, focusing on the volume of lobbying relations between 
fossil-capital organizations and state targets (both institutions and DPOHs). As a fully 
relational method, network analysis has in recent years proven useful to political scientists 
in ‘effectively analyzing the interdependence and flows of influence among individuals, 
groups, and institutions’ (Ward et al 2011: 245). Network analysis takes us beyond overall 
rates of lobbying (as reported above) into the configuration of social relations that comprise 
the lobbying space.13  A social network consists in a set of nodes, some of which are directly 
linked to others through edges, i.e., relations. In this case, the relations are directed; they 
always flow from lobbyist to target. A lobbying relation entails one or more contacts between 
a lobbying organization and a state body or DPOH. Examining the network of these relations 
gives us a picture of the structure of corporate influence vis-à-vis the various organizations 
that make up the federal state apparatus. Each lobbying relation consists of a series of actual 
contacts involving lobbyists and DPOHs. By examining the frequency of such contacts as 
recorded in the Lobbyist Registry, we can determine which lobbying relations involve high 
volumes of interaction. These are the intensive relations, forming the core of the network.  
Within the timeframe of our study, the Harper government was in power for 1764 days, 
compared to 818 for the Trudeau government, affording 2.156 times as many daily 
opportunities for lobbyists to meet with state officials. The total volume of lobbying for the 
governments, respectively 7,661 and 3,791, roughly corresponds to this ratio, indicating that 
across the two regimes the overall volume of lobbying was similar. Table 4 compares 
lobbying networks for the two regimes, at two levels of lobbying volume. We designate high-
volume lobbying in the Harper years as relations involving 30 or more contacts between a 
lobbyist and a state target. Pro-rated to the shorter timeframe of the Trudeau years, high-
volume lobbying relations are deemed to involve 15 or more contacts. Considering first the 
entire network of lobbying relations, in the Harper years it took in 44 industry groups 
(corporations and industry groups) and 51 state bodies, with the former linked to the latter 
through 595 lobbying relations. The entire network under Trudeau was smaller and 
involved fewer lobbying relations overall, which is not surprising in view of the shorter time 
period under observation. When we restrict the analysis to high-volume lobbying relations, 
the core of the network, most of the edges and many of the nodes fall away. Interestingly, 
however, the network of high-volume lobbying relations in the Trudeau years is slightly 










Table 4. Comparison of Lobbying Network for the two regimes 
 N of edges N of industry 
organizations 
N of state bodies 
Harper gov’t: all 
relations 
595 44 51 
Harper Gov’t: high-
volume relations 
58 20 12 
Trudeau gov’t: all 
relations 
409 39 40 
Trudeau Gov’t: high-
volume relations 
69 25 13 
Concentration of lobbying follows the concentration of capital 
Within both regimes, lobbying is extremely concentrated among the major players and their 
intensive, high-volume lobby relations. Under Harper, the intensive lobbying relations, as 
defined above, account for only 9.75% of all lobbying relations (59 of 595), but these 
relations represent 94.3% of all the 7,661 lobbying contacts occurring between industry and 
the federal state apparatus. Similarly, under Trudeau intensive lobbying relations account 
for only 9.8% of all lobbying relations (40 of 369), but these relations represent 95.9% of all 
the 3,791 lobbying contacts occurring between industry and the federal state apparatus. 
Across the two administrations, the overall pattern of lobbying is stable: among the 239 
fossil-capital companies we included in our sweep of the Lobbyist Registry, the Pearson 
correlation14 between frequency of contacts during the Harper regime and frequency of 
contacts during Trudeau is 0.887.   
Fossil-capital lobbying, like fossil capital itself, is concentrated among relatively few 
large corporations. For the 239 companies, the Pearson correlation between frequency of 
contacts and 2014 firm revenue is 0.728 for the Harper years and 0.820 for the Trudeau 
years. Using 2014 assets as a measure of size (which favours companies with large amounts 
of fixed capital), the correlations are even higher: 0.810 and 0.837 respectively. Not 
surprisingly, among the 239 fossil-capital firms, active lobbying at the federal level is 
restricted to a small fraction of companies. Across the entire period, 205 companies did no 
lobbying; five firms lobbied only under Harper; four lobbied only under Trudeau. The close 
relationship between firm size and lobbying is highlighted when we isolate the 10 largest 
companies by 2014 revenue, which all rank among the top lobbyists. In the Harper years, 
67.6% of all corporate lobbying (4,191 contacts in total) involved these 10 firms; for Trudeau 
the figure is 71.7%. The simple contrast between the top 10 revenue earners and the 229 
smaller firms accounts, under Harper, for 62.1% of the variance in frequency of contacts; 
under Trudeau for 66.5%. 
As we have seen, lobbying activity at the federal level is concentrated among a few 
industry groups that tend to represent the larger concentrations of fossil capital. Six of 14 
industry groups account for 89.5% of fossil industry-group contacts under Harper and for 
92.0% under Trudeau. As a group, the four most active industry associations (CAPP, Mining 




Association of Canada, CEPA and Canadian Gas Association, each representing very large 
corporations) account for 76.8% of all lobbying by the 14 industry associations over the 
entire 2011-2018 period. We can also discern change over time, associated with sectoral rise 
and decline: the Coal Association of Canada lobbied the Harper government 10 times but did 
not lobby the Trudeau government. The BC LNG Association did not lobby the Harper 
government but lobbied the Trudeau government seven times. We can conclude that the 
concentration in lobbying closely follows in the grooves of the ongoing concentration of 
fossil capital.15 
Mapping the core network: state targets and lobbying organizations  
Figure 4 shows state institutions with 30 or more lobbying contacts with fossil-fuel 
organizations under the Harper regime. In the diagram, each node represents a specific 
institution, with the brown circles referring to the fossil-capital organizations and the blue 
squares depicting state targets. The size of nodes indicate the (degree) centrality of the 
institutions and organizations within the network (the more central the organization, the 
larger the node). Their locations on the diagrams are also good indicators of their relative 
importance: the key fossil-capital organizations and state targets tend to be located in the 
centre of the graph. By contrast, nodes are smaller for the less important organizations and 
typically appear on the periphery of the graph. Line thickness is proportional to the number 
of lobbying contacts between carbon firms and government institutions. 
Figure 4 - Network diagram for lobbying relations involving 30 or more contacts, Harper 
administration 
 
In the Harper years, the main industry players focused their lobbying efforts on a dozen 
key state bodies. The high-volume lobby relations focused on Natural Resources Canada 
(NRCanada), politicians associated with the House of Commons (CommonsP) and, to a lesser 
extent, Environment Canada, with Foreign Affairs (DFAITC), Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
Development (AAND), and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) being the only other state 




































lobbyists, CAPP and the Mining Association of Canada maintained extensive high-volume 
lobbying networks reaching into various state bodies and particularly the triad just 
mentioned. CAPP logged 335 contacts with Commons politicians, 180 with NRCan and 177 
with EnvirCan; the Mining Association logged 214 contacts with NRCan, 186 with the 
Commons and 102 with EnvirCan. But TransCanada Corporation and several other firms also 
maintained fairly extensive lobbying networks. Three industry associations and four 
corporations each had high-volume relations with the same triad of state core state 
organizations throughout the Harper years. 
Figure 5: network diagram for lobbying relations involving 15 or more contacts, Trudeau 
administration 
 
Figure 5 depicts the lobbying relations between these state targets and the fossil-capital 
organizations under Trudeau.  The high-volume lobby relations under Trudeau continue to 
target Natural Resources Canada, the Commons, and Environment Canada, which seem to 
form a state-capital nexus on issues of carbon extraction. If anything, the network has 
become more tightly focused around this triad, with five industry associations and six 
corporations logging high-volume lobby relations with all three state bodies. The Mining 
Association of Canada has gained prominence in the network, while CAPP’s volume of 
lobbying has declined. Among the corporates, Suncor stands out for its extensive lobbying of 
both Environment Canada (82 contacts) and Natural Resources Canada (69 contacts). Global 
Affairs (formerly Foreign Affairs) continues to be a target for the Mining Association (which 
also represents metal-mining firms, some of them with extensive foreign investments) and 
for TransCanada, whose Keystone XL project has been strongly pitched to US state managers 
by both the Harper and Trudeau governments. CEPA now targets the National Energy Board 
(NEB), likely concerning changes, as discussed below, to the NEB and environmental review 











































involving firms that CEPA represents, such as Northern Gateway and the Trans Mountain 
Pipeline Expansion). 
As we can see in both sociograms, intensive lobbying is largely restricted to the major 
players, which have the resources for permanent campaigns, and it is aimed at a select few 
centres of state power. This suggests that the network core comprises a ‘small world’ of 
intense interaction among a relatively few lobbyists and the designated public office holders 
who are their targets.    
The small world of designated public office holders 
As we saw earlier, leading DPOHs meet extensively with the representatives of fossil capital. 
In this section, our network analysis centres upon the 20 most-lobbied DPOHs of each 
administration.  
The Harper years 
In the Harper years, the 20 DPOHs account for 1,785 of 7,661 contacts: nearly a quarter 
of all lobbying (23.3%) was targeted at this small group.  Although within the Registry each 
DPOH typically has one main state affiliation, these can be variable – either due to actual 
position changes or to designating the same person in different ways; hence the mapping 
displays multiple state affiliations for many of the DPOHs.  In all, the fossil-fuel sector logged 
373 lobbying relations with these 20 individuals, creating a network, shown in Figure 8, of 
37 industry organizations (brown squares) and 17 state bodies (blue squares), with the 20 
DPOHs (red circles) mediating between them. The network is to some extent bifurcated 
between DPOHs affiliated with the Ministry of Natural Resources (predominantly, the red 
circles at the left and bottom) and DPOHs affiliated with the Ministry of Environment, with 
the former attracting considerably more attention.  















































































We can see how each DPOH funnels communications from an array of industry 
representatives into his/her respective state agency. For instance, at the bottom centre of 
the sociogram, Mike Beale, Assistant Deputy Minister at Environment Canada (having met 
with 21 different industry organizations 241 times during the later Harper years), was 
intensively lobbied by CAPP (76 meetings) and the Canadian Fuels Association (61 
meetings). In Figure 9, the social circle of industry organizations lobbying Beale, a 
functionary ostensibly tasked with environmental protection, speaks volumes about fossil-
capital influence over environmental policy.   
Figure 9. Mike Beale’s social circle, Harper years   
 
Beale’s heavily targeted colleagues at Environment Canada recorded fewer meetings 
overall and show distinct patterns of contact with industry. Collen Volk logged 56 meetings 
in total with 11 organizations, but 26 meetings were with the Mining Association of Canada. 
Deputy Minister Bob Hamilton, logging 82 meetings, shows a more diffuse pattern, 
connecting with 24 organizations, including 17 meetings with CAPP. For much of the 2011-
2015 period Peter Kent (positioned near the top of the map in Figure 8) served as 
Environment Minister and met with 20 fossil-capital organizations a total of 67 times, but no 
one organization stands out (CAPP merited 9 meetings, Suncor 7, Imperial Oil and Cenovus 
6 etc.). The same pattern holds for Michelle Rempel, a Calgary-based parliamentarian who 
served as parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Environment, beginning in May 2011. 
This pattern suggests a division of labour among state officials, as specific public servants 
take primary responsibility for meeting with certain lobbying organizations, while elected 
politicians maintain a wider but more diffuse array of fossil-capital contacts. In all, two 
politicians and four public servants affiliated with Environment were extensively targeted in 
the Harper years.  
At Natural Resources Canada, the situation was a little different. Eleven DPOHs 
associated with this ministry were targeted, including ten top public servants and Joe Oliver 




























2011 to 2014 (and then as Finance Minister). Oliver, whose social circle is shown in Figure 
10, was lobbied 112 times by 27 fossil-capital organizations, including TransCanada (12 
meetings), KinderMorgan (10), Encana (9) and CAPP (8), mainly during his tenure as 
Minister of Natural Resources.   
Figure 10. Joe Oliver’s social circle, Harper years   
 
Among the mandarins at Natural Resources, Marian Campbell-Jarvis was heavily lobbied 
by the Mining Association of Canada (48 of her 56 meetings), as was Anil Arora (40 of 67 
meetings). Chris Praught’s 88 meetings featured conversations with Suncor (11), CAPP and 
TransCanada (10 each).  The other five public servants logged a total of 491 contacts, a good 
number of which involved CAPP (14 with Mark Corey, 11 with Serge Dupont, 13 with Michael 
Keenen, 21 with Jay Khosla), the Mining Association of Canada (14 with Serge Dupont, 11 
with Jay Khosla), CEPA (11 with Mark Corey, 23 with Jay Khosla), and Canadian Gas 
Association (21 with Jay Khosla, 13 with David McArthur, who was also affiliated with 
Aboriginal Affairs).  
A third notable category of DPOHs is comprised of elected politicians unaffiliated with 
the two ministries most targeted by the carbon-extractive sector. Here, Calgary-based Jason 
Kenney (positioned at the top left of Figure 8) stands out. Kenney, as an insider and cabinet 
minister in the Harper government, was intensely lobbied by a wide array of organizations. 
Some of these organizations backed his campaign to become Premier of Alberta in the 2019 
Alberta election (McCarthy, 2019). Leon Benoit and James Rajotte were also Conservative 
parliamentarians extensively lobbied by the fossil fuel sector. 
It is well known that in the Harper government power was particularly concentrated in 
the PMO (positioned at the top right in Figure 8). There, Greg McFarlane, a senior policy 
advisor, was lobbied by 22 organizations, with the Mining Association logging 16 meetings, 
CAPP logging 15, and TransCanada logging 11. McFarlane was joined as a PMO official by 
Dave Forestell, who was also affiliated with Natural Resources Canada and was lobbied by 




































our other views of the network in the Harper years, Natural Resources clearly attracted more 
industry attention than Environment. Eleven DPOHs affiliated with Natural Resources were 
heavily lobbied, compared to six DPOHs affiliated with Environment, perhaps reflecting the 
relative power capacities of these two ministries within the Harper regime.  
The Trudeau years 
In the first part of Trudeau’s mandate, to early 2018, the top 20 DPOHs account for 1,226 
of 3,791 meetings, or nearly a third, indicating that lobbying has become somewhat more 
concentrated among the top DPOHs. Also in contrast to the Harper administration, each of 
the 20 most-lobbied DPOHs tends to be affiliated to just one state body. Lobbying relations 
between corporates and these officials total 345 and include 33 industry organizations but 
only nine state bodies. The lobbying network has become more focused on fewer state 
agencies, with Natural Resources Canada and Environment Canada holding pride of place. 
Figure 11. The Network of 20 most-lobbied DPOHs, Trudeau years 
 
Indeed, as we see in Figure 11, under Trudeau the network has become more bifurcated 
between Natural Resources and Environment, particularly as we note that the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA, positioned at the top right) reports to the federal 
Minister of the Environment, and could be considered a branch of that Ministry. Ten of the 
leading DPOHs are affiliated with Natural Resources, seven are affiliated with Environment, 
two are affiliated with CEAA and one is affiliated with the Ministry of Finance. Senior public 
servants are heavily targeted, with Mike Beale continuing to attract many lobbyists at 
Environment, along with Ministers Catherine McKenna at Environment and Jim Carr at 
Natural Resources (as well as Kim Rudd, parliamentary secretary to Carr, and Jonathan 
Wilkinson, parliamentary secretary to McKenna).  
Among the industry organizations, the Mining Association and CAPP stand out, along 


































































Association is especially central, showing lobbying relations with 19 DPOHs, 16 of whom 
were solicited at least five times. CAPP lobbied 18 of the 20 top DPOHs, although only six of 
these relations involved five or more meetings (and all of these relatively intense relations 
were with public servants). Among the corporations, TransCanada’s heavy targeting of 
DPOHs under Harper has fallen away, but Suncor has stepped up its lobbying, contacting 19 
of 20 top DPOHs in the Trudeau government’s early years, 10 of them on at least five 
occasions. Imperial Oil, Cenovus, Encana, and Teck are also heavily engaged in lobbying the 
key DPOHs associated with both Environment Canada and Natural Resources Canada. Some 
public-servant DPOHs carry over from one regime to the next, along with their lobbying 
contacts in industry. For instance, Marian Campbell-Jarvis at Natural Resources continues to 
meet regularly with the Mining Association (logging 23 meetings), as does Mike Beale at 
Environment (logging 18). 
Mapping the lobbying relations that converge upon the two Ministers, Carr and McKenna 
(Figure 12), we find that Carr was lobbied by 25 industry organizations and McKenna by 21. 
All but one of the industry organizations lobbying McKenna also lobbied Carr, and the 
tendency was for Carr (whose tenure as Minister of Natural Resources ended with a cabinet 
shuffle in July 2018) to meet more frequently with industry representatives.16  
Figure 12. Lobbying Relations Targeting Jim Carr or Catherine McKenna, Trudeau 
years 
 
Noting that 131 of the edges in Figure 11 depict lobbying relations in which only one 
meeting occurred between the parties, in Figure 13 we show only the 93 relations during the 
Trudeau years that involved five or more meetings between lobbyists the DPOHs. Node size 
is proportionate to centrality in this reduced network, which contains 19 of the 20 DPOHs, 
six state bodies with which they are affiliated, and 16 industry organizations. The two target 
ministries form opposite poles, with the Mining Association of Canada, Suncor, and Shell 



































the industry organizations are engaged in intensive lobbying with DPOHs in both ministries. 
Big Carbon appears to have taken to Justin Trudeau’s 2015 election pledge that ‘We can 
create clean jobs, grow our economy, and protect our environment by working 
together’(Liberal Party of Canada). 
Figure 13. The Network of Most-lobbied DPOHs, relations involving five or more 
meetings, Trudeau years 
 
In both regimes we find at the network’s core, a small world of leading industry 
organizations, designated lobbyists, and DPOHs associated with state agencies key to fossil-
capital interests, who are in regular contact with each other. 
Conclusion 
Lobbying is continually dominated by wealthy and corporate interests and is conducted 
largely away from public view. As Brulle (2018, 302) suggests, “control over the nature and 
flow of information to government decision-makers can be significantly altered by the 
lobbying process, and creates a situation of systematically distorted communication.” As 
lobbying creates elite networks of decision makers that exclude the general public, it runs 
counter to democracy. 
From January 4, 2011 to January 30, 2018, 11,452 lobbying contacts (just over six 
contacts per working day) were recorded between the fossil fuel industry and federal 
government officials. As we found, the fossil fuel industry is far more active in lobbying 
federally than other resource and manufacturing associations, while the amount of lobbying 
by environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) pales in comparison.  
Continuing the pattern discerned between 2008 and 2012 by Cayley-Daoust and Girard 
(2012), the bulk of carbon capital’s lobbying efforts are carried out by a few large 
corporations (and industry associations representing the major players) that control much 
of this economic sector. The pattern of lobbying closely mirrors the ongoing concentration 
of fossil capital, further outlined by Carroll and Huijzer (2018), and underlines the 
importance of industry associations that express fractional interests of industrial 













































most lobbying by the fossil fuel industry. Lobbying is strategically focused on key elected 
politicians as well as two key ministries – one dedicated to extractivism, the other, 
ostensibly, to environmental protection – and the officials in them. Therefore, the network, 
at its core, amounts to a ‘small world’ of intense interaction among relatively few 
lobbyists/firms and the designated public office holders in select centres of state power, who 
are their targets. 
In comparing lobbying across the Harper and Trudeau administrations, we found a 
pattern of continuity-in-change. Under Trudeau, the bulk of lobbying has been carried out by 
the same large firms as under Harper, while the lobbying network has become yet more 
focused on fewer state agencies, with Natural Resources Canada and Environment and 
Climate Change Canada holding pride of place. The diminished role of Members of 
Parliament as lobbying targets under the Trudeau administration, and the growing 
significance, on the other hand, of senior public servants and midlevel staff within the former 
state agencies, indicate a strategy of targeting the key decision-makers and state actors that 
remained after the change of government.  
Our findings points to the existence of a ‘deep state,’ a form of co-government, far 
outlasting election cycles whereby key state institutions and actors within them develop 
long-term relationships with leading corporations and private interests that contribute 
extensively to policy formulation (Lofgren, 2016; Taft, 2017). They also echo Urquhart 
(2018), who has demonstrated that the “institutional legacy” of carbon capital-friendly rules 
and institutions federally and provincially is highly resilient even in the face of electoral 
change. 
In this paper we have provided an architectonic overview of lobbying at the federal level, 
analyzing the structure of carbon capital influence vis-à-vis the various organizations that 
make up the federal state. The thousands of meetings taking place between corporate and 
state officials comprise a definite structure of corporate influence, yet our network analysis 
is silent as to the content of the relations we have mapped.  Further work could endeavour 
to tie lobbying efforts more closely to the formation of policy. While it is not possible to 
determine the extent to which a given lobbying effort directly influences a specific policy 
outcome (and limitations of the federal Lobbying Act make it challenging to trace the precise 
nature of a lobbying event or meeting17), research could more closely analyze the timing and 
intensity of lobbying in reference to high-stakes moments and issues for key industry 
players, such as decisions surrounding pipeline proposals.  
Moreover, in this paper, we considered only one of the most direct and obvious means 
by which carbon corporations influence the political process. A full accounting of such 
practices would include tracking political party donations (which remain largely 
unregulated in Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan, and the 
Yukon) and “revolving door” relations or close personal ties between the corporate 
community and various government departments, agencies, boards and commissions.   
The ‘direct’ lobbying efforts we analyzed should also be understood as an important 
component of a broader elite policy planning or governance network (Brulle, 2018; 
Drutman, 2015). The latter includes a wide range of business efforts to shape both public 
and political perspective and opinion, via corporate funded and directed think-tanks, policy-
planning organizations, and grassroots campaigns. Indeed, Donald Gutstein (2018), has 
extensively documented the role of think tanks and policy-planning organizations (along 
with oil companies and industry associations) in shaping Canadian climate change policy. 




This includes, for example, the Business Council of Canada’s influence over the Trudeau 
government’s national climate strategy, including the “grand bargain” of acquiescing to a 
price on carbon on one side, while building pipelines on the other (ibid). Therefore, while 
deep-state co-governance is clearly a departure from democratic practice, it should not be 
seen as restricted to the fossil fuel lobby, nor as a recently emergent phenomenon. 
Challenging these multiple modalities of corporate power and influence, as part of the effort 
to democratize and decisively transform the state at various scales (from the local, regional, 
national, and international), will be critical to the effort to transition away from fossil fuels 





1 This paper is part of the Corporate Mapping Project (CMP), a research and public engagement initiative 
investigating the power of the fossil fuel industry. The CMP is jointly led by the University of Victoria, 
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives and the Parkland Institute. The CMP is funded primarily by the 
Social Science and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC). 
2 Carbon capital is a ‘fraction’ of capital embedded within wider structures of corporate power and linked 
to other fractions (including financial capital) via commodity chains and financial flows (Carroll, 2017). 
We also refer to this fraction as fossil capital. 
3 We use the term lobbying chain to refer to the different organizations/institutions and actors that are 
involved in a lobbying contact. The chain involves four components: lobbying organization – individual 
lobbyist(s) – state organization(s)– public office holder(s). While the chain image allows us to consider 
different organizations and agents involved in lobbying, it should be noted that lobbying relationships are 
not unidirectional; corporations hire lobbyists to influence decision-makers in key state bodies, yet 
government may also convene meetings with industry representatives. Under the federal Lobbying Act, the 
latter are reported as lobbying. 
4 We analyze only the total number of lobbying contacts carried out by ENGOs and non-fossil fuel industry 
associations. Future research could provide a comparative analysis of ENGO lobbying across the two 
administrations as well as analyzing the state bodies and designated public office holders lobbied by them. 
5 On the development of unconventional shale gas in the Canadian context and associated governance and 
regulatory challenges, see Stephenson and Shaw (2013). For an analysis of offshore oil and gas 
development in Atlantic Canada and its regulatory regimes and social and environmental concerns, see 
Clancy (2011). 
6 While pointing to reliance on oil revenue as an explanation for ‘democratic deficits,’ the authors cited here 
recognize the crucial importance of ideology and policy directions in ‘petro-state’ formation. They point to 
the need to avoid undue focus on the commodity of oil itself, in favour of more complex explanations that 
include a focus on royalty and taxation regimes as well as public ownership frameworks in accounting for 
state-society relations (see especially Shrivastava, 2015). Similarly, in his political economic history of the 
growth of tar sands beginning in the 1990s, Urquhart (2018) demonstrates that the boom was facilitated by 
a radical departure in government resource policy. He argues that both federally and provincially, the 
prevailing nationalist “think like an owner” approach to resource management was discredited and 
superseded by ideology of “market fundamentalism.” In the process, the industry was 'reregulated' in a 
manner that suited private interests, and the state (particularly at the provincial level and in Alberta) largely 
abdicated its role in managing and controlling resource development and growth. 
 





7 Moulding effects refer to an institutionalized bias towards facilitating rather than robustly regulating fossil 
fuel development, leading to reduced state capacity. Examples of such effects, often witnessed in regions 
with high levels of fossil fuel revenue dependency, and cited by Carter (2014, 2016) include: centralizing 
environmental regulation in a pro-development ministry, privatizing regulation (industry self-reporting), 
avoiding consideration of environmental effects at the land tenure stage, blocking or limiting public 
participation in environmental review hearings, not addressing gaps in scientific research (especially 
baseline data and cumulative impacts), minimizing protected areas or effective land planning, and 
inadequate monitoring and lack of government regulation on newer issues (such as emissions). 
8 DPOHs include Ministers of the Crown or Ministers of State and any person employed in their offices; all 
Members of Parliament and all Senators as well as any staff working in the offices of the Leaders of the 
Opposition in the House of Commons and the Senate; public office holders, who occupy senior executive 
positions, whether by the title of deputy minister, chief executive officer or by some other title, or associate 
deputy ministers, assistant deputy ministers, or occupy a position of comparable rank. 
9 The figures shown in this table and totals discussed throughout the paper refer to total lobbying contacts 
with DPOHs, rather than individual lobbying ‘events.’ Therefore, if two DPOHs are involved in a meeting 
with a lobbyist this counts as two contacts. Just over 60% of lobbying events involved only one DPOH.  
10 The high number of lobbying contacts recorded by MAC may be explained by the breadth of firms and 
interests it represents, while its overtaking of CAPP as the most prominent lobbyist in the network, 
especially under the Trudeau administration, could be linked to a Liberal campaign promise to assess and 
strengthen Canada’s corporate social responsibility approach regarding Canadian-owned mines in 
developing countries (see Mazereeuw, 2016). Indeed, as noted below, Global Affairs Canada, which 
oversees international trade, including ‘responsible business practices abroad,’ was heavily targeted by the 
Association. MAC’s increased lobbying activity under Trudeau, especially beginning in 2016, was also 
likely linked to the Review of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act. Immediately following the 
announcement of a federal review of Canada’s environmental laws on June 20, 2016, the association 
announced that it “plans to be a full, active participant in the federal government’s review of environmental 
and regulatory processes” (Mining Association of Canada, 2016). 
11 The Privy Council category contains specific government positions of the Prime Minister, Governor 
General, House Leader, Ministers, and Parliamentary Secretaries. The Parliamentarian refers to Members 
of Parliament and Senators (a small number of provincial politicians are also lumped into this bracket). Top 
bureaucrats consist of the deputy minister, associate deputy minister, ambassador, diplomat, parliamentary 
budget officer, and various chief executive titles such as the Governor of the Bank of Canada. Senior public 
servants are the government staffers one level below the top bureaucrats: the (associate) assistant deputy 
minister, judge, commissioner, chief of staff, superintendent, director general, executive director, and all 
the deputy chief executive positions such as the CFO and VP. The midlevel staff group encompasses 
advisor, policy advisor, manger, director, and deputy chief of staff. Lastly, junior staff contains the assistant, 
clerk, and secretary. An additional and non-functional category is ‘other’, which has enveloped all the non-
governmental or unclassifiable positions, including military officers, scientists, and veterinarians. This very 
heterogeneous category is not included in the analysis of DPOHs. 
12 Senior government bureaucrats here include only nonpartisan top bureaucrats (DM, ADM and President) 
and senior public servants (AADM and VP), while party-affiliated Chief of Staff is excluded. 
13 We used UCINET to construct the lobbying networks and Netdraw (a program packaged with UCINET) 
to provide the sociograms presented herein. See Borgatti, Everett and Freeman (2014). 
 





14 The Pearson correlation is a statistical measure of the extent to which two variables are linearly related. 
The Pearson correlation varies from -1 (indicating a perfect inverse relationship) to +1 (indicating a perfect 
direct relationship, with the values of one variable rising exactly in step with the values of the other 
variable). 
15 While we find that the same large firms maintained relatively steady rates of lobbying over the period of 
our study, certain organizations’ lobbying efforts ebbed and flowed. CAPP, for example, was the leading 
lobbyist for almost three consecutive years from January 4, 2011 to November 3, 2013. In the final year of 
the Harper government and under Trudeau’s leadership it continued to play a central but less dominant role. 
While an analysis of the timing and intensity of lobbying in reference to high-stakes moments and issues is 
beyond the scope of our study, as the literature on lobbying suggests (see de Figueiredo and Richter, 2014) 
developments regarding investment projects and regulatory initiatives also determine which firms lobby 
and when. 
16 Two noteworthy exceptions: Teck Resources, which has branded itself as a green extractivist despite 
major recent investments in bitumen mining, met with Carr twice but with McKenna five times; Suncor 
Energy met with Carr seven times and with McKenna 11 times. Suncor is also an advocate of green 
capitalism. Its current ‘greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions goal: ‘harness technology and innovation to 
reduce our emission intensity by 30 per cent by 2030’ (https://www.suncor.com/sustainability/ghg-goal). 
As is widely known by environmentalists, modestly reducing emission intensity while ramping up carbon 
extraction – Suncor’s actual business strategy – produces increased carbon emissions.   
17 An important limitation to the Lobbying Act surrounds the lack of detailed information on the subjects 
discussed during lobbying events. While the ‘subject matter details’ are recorded, the self-reported nature 
of the Act means that lobbyists often provide only thin descriptions of the topics discussed. Furthermore, 
subject matter details are not traceable to individual meetings/communications, but rather they are 
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Appendix A: Abbreviations for Tables and Figures   
AAND  Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development  
ATCO  ATCO Group     
Can Fuels Assn. Canadian Fuels Association    
Can Gas Assn. Canadian Gas Association    
CAPP  Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers  
Can Natural Res. Canadian Natural Resources Limited   
CEAA  Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency  
CommonsP House of Commons (Parliamentarian)   
CommonsS House of Commons (Staff)    
DFAITC  Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada  
DFO  Fisheries and Oceans Canada    
EconDevCan Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada 
En. Pipeline Assn. Canadian Energy Pipeline Association   
EnvirtCan  Environment and Climate Change Canada  
EMERA  Emera Inc.     
FIN  Finance Canada     
GlobAffairs Global Affairs Canada    
Kinder Morgan Kinder Morgan Canada Limited   
MAC  Mining Association of Canada    
NRCan  Natural Resources Canada    
PCO  Privy Council Office     
Petro Serv Assn. Petroleum Services Association of Canada  
PMO  Prime Minister's Office    
Senate  Senate of Canada     
Sherritt Int'l Sherritt International    
Suncor  Suncor Energy     
TC  Transport Canada     
TransCanada TransCanada Corporation    
Westcoast Westcoast Energy Inc.    
 
 
 
